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Volume 1: Issue 1
A Cause of Action for “Passing Off/Associational Marketing”
 1The Trademark Scholars Roundtable participants discussed a wide range of approaches 
to understanding and limiting the ever-increasing sprawl of trademark rights. It was a 
productive and stimulating discussion. In this essay, I would like to combine some of my 
own ideas with points and suggestions made by the other participants, to sketch out a possible 
judicial approach to regulating the sprawl. Before discussing a potential solution, however, it 
is important to understand the nature of the problem, and some of its primary causes. 
Section I will discuss the problem and set the stage for my proposal. Section II will 
then suggest that courts relegate certain particularly problematic new forms of trademark 
infringement claims to a “passing off/associational marketing” evaluation. It will anchor 
this proposal in the historic development of the common law and courts’ construction of the 
Lanham Act, and then explore some of the rules, presumptions and defenses that might cabin 
this more limited cause of action.
I. The Problem
???? ??????? ?????????? ?????????? ???? ??? ?????? ?? ???????? ????????? ??? ??????????? ?????????
competition by enabling merchants to adopt a particular word or symbol to identify their 
goods, and prevent other merchants from using a confusingly similar word or symbol to 
identify their own goods, when doing so would be likely to cause mistaken purchases. These 
limited rights in words and symbols ensure that consumers can easily and quickly identify 
and distinguish the goods of competing producers and effectively exercise their purchasing 
preferences. This reduces consumer search costs and enables consumers to reward quality 
through repeat patronage. The potential for repeat patronage, in turn, enables producers to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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However, courts recognized that overprotection of marks can actually undercut marketplace 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of useful marketplace information to consumers. Overly broad rights in marks may prevent 
competing producers from effectively communicating the nature, qualities and characteristics 
of their own products to interested consumers, or prevent competitors, consumers or the 
media from engaging in critical product critiques and commentary. Overly broad protection 
of marks may prevent or unnecessarily complicate development of new digital technologies 
that assist consumers and promote competition by enhancing or aggregating available product 
information. Overly broad protection of marks may enable mark owners to prevent competitors 
from selling similar unpatented products and erect other barriers to market entry. Moreover, 
rights in marks may intrude impermissibly on the public’s First Amendment interests in 
freedom of speech. To ensure that harmful overprotection would not occur, courts built a 
number of limiting doctrines into the infringement cause of action, and have invoked a range 
of external limitations as well.
Thus, trademark law is best understood as a careful balance of competing marketplace 
interests. Nonetheless, over the years, the scope of trademark protection has gradually but 
steadily expanded. Under modern marketing practices, marks have grown from symbols 
to enable consumers to differentiate products to sophisticated selling tools, the subject of 
tremendous investment and careful, expert sculpting. Mark owners have come to view marks 
as vital business assets in themselves—“brands” that encompass and convey not just source, 
but a whole construct of compelling imagery, prestige, personality, and hooks to facilitate 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Where investment goes, an inherent sense of property right tends to follow, regardless of 
what black-letter law has to say about it. The notion of property arises from a deep-seated (if 
???????? ??????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????? ?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
even when doing so may promote the overall public good. Free riding feels uncomfortably 
like theft. So as marks take on psychological attributes of property (by virtue of their owners’ 
investment), additional notions of actionable harm come to the fore. As Mark Lemley 
succinctly put it: If any value that arises from use or reference to a mark should belong to the 
mark owner, then the mark owner is “harmed” whenever someone else derives value from the 
use or reference without paying for a license. Never mind that the use caused no consumers 
to make mistaken purchases, and may actually have promoted consumer interests in price and 
quality competition, or constituted First Amendment protected expression.
Mark owners communicate their attitudes about investment and property to courts and 
the public: Investments need to be protected, and perhaps more harm, beyond undercutting 
consumer reliance interests and deprivation of license revenue, arises from unauthorized 
use of marks. Others’ unauthorized use or reference to the mark may create new, unwanted 
consumer associations with the mark, may distort or diminish the carefully cultivated brand 
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identity, may undercut the carefully honed aura of exclusivity and uniqueness. To protect 
their investment, many mark owners would like complete control over use of their word or 
symbol. Concerns arise: if mark owners can’t have the desired control over their marks, they 
may not invest in brand differentiation, or even in innovative new products and services.
The complicating factor, of course, is that such expansive property rights in  words and 
symbols is likely to cause the serious competition, technological development, and First 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????
is “information as to source,” so that consumers can assign good will or blame to the proper 
producer and repeat satisfactory purchases. All the additional hype and imagery of a “brand” 
?????????????????????????????????1 And as the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed, Congress 
designed the patent and copyright laws, not trademark law, to provide economic incentives 
to invest in creative endeavors.2 Overly broad construction of trademark law can actually 
undercut the effectiveness of Congress’ innovation and investment-inducing strategies under 
the Patent and Copyright Acts.
Notwithstanding such practical considerations, however, the inherent, emotionally resonant 
?????? ??? ????????? ???? ??????? ???? ????????? ?????????? ????? ?????????? ??? ?????????? ????????
decision-making process in trademark infringement cases. It has lead courts repeatedly to 
extend the scope of actionable “likelihood of confusion.” 
Initially, the only actionable confusion was confusion about product source, which could 
lead consumers to buy the defendant’s product, thinking it was the plaintiff’s. Clearly such 
confusion is harmful, as it undercuts consumers’ ability to rely on marks for information 
about product source (which in turn enables them to infer product quality and characteristics), 
and thus intelligently exercise their purchasing preferences. And the resulting inability of 
purchasers to repeat satisfying purchases undercuts mark owners’ incentive to invest in product 
quality. Courts later extended infringement liability to uses of marks that created a likelihood 
of consumer confusion about whether the mark owner sponsored the defendant’s product or 
whether the parties were ?????????. As Mark McKenna and Mark Lemley point out,3 there is 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
franchise others to produce related products under their marks, a defendant’s unauthorized 
use of the mark might cause consumers mistakenly to predict that the defendant’s product 
has quality or characteristics they associate with the mark owner, and mistakenly purchase a 
product that lacks those attributes. This harms consumers, and, to the extent that consumers 
2    See, e.g.,  Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 33-34 (2003), TrafFix Devices, 
Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001). 
3    Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, ??????????????????????62 STAN. L. REV. 413 (2010).1.  Ralph Brown, ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????, 57 YALE L. J. 1165, 
1180–81 (1948).
2.  See, e.g.,  Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003), TrafFix Devices, 
Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001). 
3.  Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, ??????????????????????62 STAN. L. REV. 413 (2010).
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hold the mark owner responsible for the defendant’s unsatisfactory quality and characteristics, 
this may injure the mark owner’s reputation and undercut its incentive to invest in product 
quality. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????? ???????
societal standpoint if consumers rely on it to make assumptions about product quality or 
characteristics. Absent reliance for such quality-related information, confusion about the 
existence of a license agreement, in particular, causes none of the harm that trademark law 
traditionally has undertaken to address. Courts have nonetheless imposed infringement liability 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
might rely on mistaken assumptions about relationship for substantive information about 
product quality or characteristics. For example, courts have repeatedly relied on possible 
consumer confusion about the existence of a license agreement to permit sports teams to 
enjoin others’ replication of their marks on the fronts of tee shirts and hats. It is unlikely that 
consumers consider the possibility of a team license in evaluating the quality of the shirt or 
hat. However, since good will for the sports team creates demand for the shirts, courts have 
enabled the team mark owners (through their licensees) to monopolize the market for the shirts 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????4  
???????? ???????? ??? ???? ?????????? ??????? ????????? ??????? ????? ????? ??????? ????? ???
??????? ????????????? ?????????????????????????????? ???????? ?????????????????????????? ?????
????????????????? ?????5 Mark owners often pay movie producers to depict their products and 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
license? Surely consumers will not rely on the presence of “Caterpillar” on a tractor depicted 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????
tickets based on the assumption that the tractor mark owner oversaw and controlled the 
???????????????????? ???????? ???? ??????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????
of their mark. A movie’s depiction of a “Caterpillar” tractor destroying pristine rain forest 
may be inconsistent with the image the mark owner wants the mark to convey. It may thus 
????????????? ???????????????????????? ????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
Amendment interests in free artistic expression.
Courts have also expanded the scope of actionable consumer confusion by imposing 
liability for “initial interest confusion”—temporary confusion about whether the defendant is 
related to the mark owner, that is cleared up prior to any purchase transaction. There are no 
mistaken purchases, because the temporarily confused consumers do not rely on the mark for 
4    See, e.g., Boston Athletic Assn. v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1989); Boston Prof’l Hockey Assn., Inc. 
v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975), ????????????? 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
5    See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F.Supp.2d 913 (C.D. Ill. 2003); Wham-O, Inc. v. 
Paramount Pictures Corp., 286 F.Supp.2d 1254 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
4.  See, e.g., Boston Athletic Assn. v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1989); Boston Prof’l Hockey Assn., Inc. v. 
Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975), ????????????? 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
5.  See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. Ill. 2003); Wham-O, Inc. v. Paramount 
Pictures Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
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information about the quality or characteristics of the product they ultimately buy. But the 
???????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
it the opportunity to make its own sales pitch. This constitutes free riding on the mark’s 
good will. Courts have also based infringement liability on “post-sale confusion,” where 
the purchaser knows exactly what she is buying, but persons encountering the product after 
the purchase might confuse the defendant’s product with the mark owner’s. Such confusion 
may possibly mislead the post-sale observers about the qualities and characteristics of the 
??????????????????????? ???? ????????? ?????? ??????????????????? ??? ????????????????????? ???
the future. But perhaps more importantly, if prospective purchasers observe too many rank 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
undercut the mark owner’s investment in creating an aura of mark prestige and exclusivity.
Apart from expanding what consumers may be confused about, and the relevant timing of their 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
on exceedingly sparse and questionable evidence.6 Courts have held that an infringement 
plaintiff may successfully demonstrate an actionable likelihood of confusion through survey 
evidence demonstrating that 10-15% of prospective purchasers may be confused.7 Some 
?????????????????????????????no real likelihood of confusion need be demonstrated at all, if the 
defendant’s reference to the plaintiff’s mark might divert potential sales.8 
Further impacting the traditional balance of competing interests, courts have lost sight of 
the “trademark use” requirement, which traditionally served as a limitation on the reach of 
mark owners’ rights. At common law, the infringement plaintiff was required to demonstrate 
that the defendant used its allegedly infringing word or symbol “as a mark,” to indicate the 
source of its own goods or services, before the issue of likelihood of confusion could be 
reached. (Use “as a mark” entailed closely, directly associating  the mark with the defendant’s 
goods or services, in a manner that was perceptible to consumers and that consumers would 
likely understand to indicate the source of those goods or services.)9  This requirement limited 
the infringement cause of action to commercial speech (which enjoys less First Amendment 
protection) in most cases, and tended to limit infringement remedies to cases in which the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
undertake further investigation into likely consumer confusion. However, with the advent of 
the Internet, courts have whittled down the “use” limitation to little more than a requirement 
that the defendant use the mark in a commercial context. They have imposed infringement 
6    See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8tht Cir. 1994), ??????????????513 U.S. 
1112 (1995); Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novack, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987), ??????????????488 U.S. 933 
(1988). 
7    J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 23:2 (2010).
8    See, e.g.?????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
9    See Margreth Barrett, ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????? ??????????? ??????43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 893 (2008).
6.  See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994), ??????????????513 U.S. 1112 
(1995); Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novack, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987), ??????????????488 U.S. 933 (1988). 
7.  J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 23:2 (2010).
8.  See, e.g.?????????????? ?????????????? ????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
9.  See Margreth Barrett, ?????????????????? ???????? ?????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????? ??????????? ???,??43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 893 (2008).
6 IP THEORY   Volume 1:  Issue 1
liability on defendants who neither offer nor advertise products or services, and against 
references to marks that are completely hidden from consumers, so that ??? meaningful 
consumer reliance would be impossible.10 
Other traditional limitations to the infringement cause of action have been gradually 
undermined because courts have linked them to the ever-expanding likelihood of confusion 
determination. For example, several Circuit Courts of Appeal held that the descriptive fair use 
??????????????????????????????????????????????11 was available only when the defendant’s 
use caused no likelihood of confusion.12 While the Supreme Court ultimately rejected this 
construction,13 lower courts have continued to consider the likelihood of confusion as an 
important factor in evaluating whether the defendant’s use was descriptive and therefore 
fair.14 Likewise, some courts have tied the concept of permissive nominative fair use to the 
absence of consumer confusion.15 The issue of likely consumer confusion is also entangled 
in determining the lawfulness of using marks in comparative advertising16 and expressive 
works,17 and in applying the doctrine of exhaustion.18
The highly subjective nature of the likelihood of confusion determination itself, combined 
?????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????
defendants to dismiss meritless claims early in litigation. The prospect of expensive and 
protracted litigation of the confusion issue leads many (if not most) defendants to settle 
overreaching infringement claims, rather than contest them. This further reinforces trademark 
owners’ control. Mark owners vigilantly send out cease and desist letters to persons making 
unauthorized reference to their marks. While most mark owners undoubtedly believe that 
the claims they assert in these letters are viable under modern trademark precedent, the 
10    See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009); PETA v. Doughney, 262 F.3d 
359 (4th Cir. 2001); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F.Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998), aff’d, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 
1998).
11   15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4)
12  See, e.g., PACCAR, Inc. v. Tile Scan Techs., LLC, 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003); KP Permanent 
Make-UP, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated,  543 U.S. 111 (2004); 
Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 796 (5th Cir. 1983).
13  KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004).
14  KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 609 (9th Cir. 2005).
15  See, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors for L.A. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 
F.3d 465, 488-89 (5th Cir. 2008), ??????????????? 129 S.Ct. 2759 (2009); Bros. Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 
F.3d 900, 908 n.5 (9th Cir. 2003), ??????????????540 U.S. 824 (2003); Merck & Co., Inc. v. Mediplan Health 
Consulting, Inc., 425 F.Supp.2d 402, 413-14 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
16  Charles of the Ritz Grp., Ltd. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc, 832 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1987); Smith v. 
Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 569 (9th Cir. 1968). 
17   Cliff Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989).
18   Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947).  In a recent case, the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
resale of plaintiff’s goods might cause a likelihood of post-sale confusion. Au-Tomotive 
Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 603 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2010).
10.  See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009); PETA v. Doughney, 262 F.3d 359 
(4th Cir. 2001); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F.Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998), aff’d, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998).
1.  15 U. .C. § 1115(b)(4)
12.  See, e.g., PACCAR, Inc. v. Tile Scan Techs., LLC, 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003); KP Permanent Make-
UP, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated,  543 U.S. 111 (2004); Zatarains, 
Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 796 (5th Cir. 1983).
13.  KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004).
14.  See, e.g., KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 609 (9th Cir. 2005).
15.  See, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors for L.A. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 
488–89 (5th Cir. 2008), ?????????? ??? 129 S.Ct. 2759 (2009); Bros. Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 908 
n 5 ( th Cir. 2003), ??????????????540 U.S. 824 (2 03); Merck & Co., Inc. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 
425 F.Supp.2d 402, 413–14 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
16.  Charles of the Ritz Grp., Ltd. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc, 832 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1987); Smith v. Chanel, 
Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 569 (9th Cir. 1968). 
17.  Cliff Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989).
18.  Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947).  In a recent case, the Ninth Circuit rejected 
?? ????????? ??? ????? ????? ???????? ??? ???? ??????? ????? ???? ???????????? ??????? ??? ???????????? ???????????? ?????? ??
likelihood of post-sale confusion. Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 603 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 
2010).
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letters and threat of expensive, protracted litigation undoubtedly chill many non-infringing, 
pro-competitive, and First Amendment-protected uses of words and symbols, making the 
???????? ??????????? ????????????? ?????????????????????????? ??????? ????? ????????????????????
precedent. And as Eric Goldman pointed out in the course of Roundtable discussion, the 
business community’s understanding of the limits of “safe” (non-letter inducing) use of 
marks informs the private policies governing use and reference to trademarks that media and 
Internet service providers such as Google, eBay, and Twitter adopt and impose on their users 
as “private law.”  
We are left with a “feedback loop,” which a number of Roundtable participants have 
discussed at one time or another. The broader the rights trademark owners assert, the broader 
consumers believe the rights to be. And the broader consumers believe the rights to be, the 
more likely they will assume that third-party uses and references are licensed (as they are 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
mislead consumers (by causing them to think that the mark owner must have licensed them 
when it has not). Courts accordingly impose liability, which leads mark owners to assert even 
broader rights, which leads consumers to think even more uses must be licensed, which leads 
??????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????
As Barton Beebe noted at the Roundtable, we are losing sight of the purpose of protecting 
trademarks: we have come to see likelihood of confusion, in itself, as the harm to be 
addressed. But likelihood of confusion is only ???????? of other possible harm, which should 
??????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ??????? ?????????????????????
which seems relentlessly to lead to increasingly stronger trademark rights, at the expense 
of competition, First Amendment, and technological development interests? I advance the 
following proposal as one possible approach.
II. A Proposed Cause of Action for “Passing Off/Associational Marketing”
I would look to the historical development of trademark law for inspiration, and suggest 
that courts revive and stress the distinction, long understood in both the common law and the 
Lanham Act, between ??????????trademarks and ?????? ??????? unfair competition, or passing 
off. Laws recognizing rights in trademarks and rights against false advertising both branched 
off from the passing off cause of action, and are essentially specialized forms or subclasses 
of that older body of law.19?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of trademark, trade name, and trade dress infringement) does not focus on the existence of 
19  For more information about the historical development and relationship of these causes of action, 
see Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28-30 (2003); Blinded Veterans Assn. v. 
Blinded Am. Veterans Found, 872 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 
F.Supp. 533 (W.D. Tex. 1980); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS ch. 35, Introductory Note, §§ 712 cmt. a, and 761 cmt. a 
(1938); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 2 cmt b, 4 cmt. b (1995).
19.  For more info mation about the historical development and relationship of these causes of ction, see Dastar 
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 2 , 28–30 (2003); Blinded Veterans Assn. v. Blinded 
Am. Veterans Found, 872 F.2d 1035 (D. . Cir. 1989); Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 
533 (W.D. Tex. 1980); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS ch. 35, Introductory Note, §§ 712 cmt. a, and 761 cmt. a (1938); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 2 cmt b, 4 cmt. b (1995).
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????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
potential marketplace harm it may cause. 
Four classes of  infringement cases clearly fall ??????? the traditional boundaries of 
trademark law and cause most of our current “sprawl-related” problems: 1) cases claiming 
only confusion about sponsorship or a license agreement, where consumers are unlikely to 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
cases in which the defendant has not made a “trademark use” of the plaintiff’s mark; 3) cases 
involving initial interest confusion or post-sale confusion; and 4) cases alleging infringement 
through non-commercial speech. I suggest that courts evaluate these cases not as infringement 
claims, but as a different category of passing off. This might serve to focus the evaluation on 
factors ?????????? the plaintiff’s ownership interest in an indication of origin, invite a more 
careful evaluation of the actual nature and magnitude of harm the defendant’s acts pose to 
the marketplace, and minimize the inherent urge to simply protect the plaintiff’s investment. 
This would also afford an opportunity to impose limits on liability that may not be needed 
in more traditional infringement contexts. To emphasize the distinction, one might simply 
characterize these non-traditional trademark claims as “passing off” claims. However, since 
trademark infringement is generally viewed as a part of the larger cause of action for passing 
off, it might be more useful to devise a new name for these claims, to emphasize that they are 
a separate and distinct subclass of the passing off group, apart from trademark infringement 
and false advertising. I would propose the name “associational marketing” for the new class 
of passing off claims.
A.  A Template in the Restatements 
The ???????????????????? and the ?????????????????????????????????????????, which are 
generally understood to restate the common law as it existed at the time of their publication, 
provide a rough template for my proposal. They each recognize a residual category of 
“passing off” claims that fall ???????????????????????of trademark, trade name, and trademark 
infringement. They both impose greater limitations on these residual “passing off” causes of 
action than they impose on infringement claims. 
The ???????????? ??? ?????, published in 1938, devoted Chapter 35, entitled “Confusion 
of Source,” to the topic at hand. It divided the chapter into three distinct subtopics: 1) 
“Fraudulent Marketing;” 2) “Infringement of Trade-Mark and Trade Name;” and 3) “Imitation 
of Appearance of Goods.”  The Introductory Note explained that while all three subtopics had 
their foundation in the historical concept of “passing off,” the American Law Institute (ALI) 
differentiated them because “[t]he protection given to the interest in trade-marks and trade 
names, and, under certain conditions, to the interest in the physical appearance of goods 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 20 Trademark, trade 
20  RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra, note 20, Introductory Note to ch. 35, 535-42 (emphasis added).
20.  RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 19, Introductory Note to ch. 35, 535–42 (emphasis added).
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??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in words or symbols. At the time the ???????????????????? was drafted, there was general 
consensus that the plaintiff should no longer be required to demonstrate the defendant’s 
fraudulent intent in trademark, trade name, and trade dress infringement cases.21 However, 
the ALI recognized that the fraudulent intent requirement should remain in place for claims 
of passing off that did not constitute infringement of protected indications of origin. The 
Restatement denominated this residual category of passing off claims “fraudulent marketing.”
The Restatement? ?????????????????? ????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
speaker is another person, or is the other person’s agent or successor, or that the goods or services 
the speaker is marketing were produced, processed, designed, or distributed by the other.22 The 
accompanying comments elaborated that an actionable fraudulent misrepresentation could 
take any form and be made in any manner “calculated to communicate its meaning.”23 No 
use of a protected trademark, trade name, or trade dress was required. Liability for fraudulent 
marketing required that the speaker act for the purpose of inducing persons to purchase his 
goods or services, and that the circumstances be such that consumers would likely rely on 
the misstatement to the commercial detriment of the plaintiff.24 This requirement of likely 
consumer reliance was essentially a requirement that the misrepresentation be material to 
consumer purchase decisions.25 
In 1995, when the ALI undertook to draft the ?????????????????????????????????????????, 
the law had further evolved to the point that fraudulent intent was no longer viewed as 
an appropriate prerequisite even for this residual category of  passing off cases that the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????26 The ??????????????????????
??????????? retained the residual category, but dropped the “Fraudulent Marketing” title 
and designated the category as a form of “deceptive marketing.” It stressed the distinction 
between “deceptive marketing” and infringement of protected indications of origin, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
with trademark, trade name, and trade dress infringement, and not under the rules set forth 
for deceptive marketing.27
21  See Margreth Barrett, ????????????????????????????????????????28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 
(2010).
22  RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra, note 20, § 712.
23  Id. at cmt. d.
24  Id., § 712 (emphasis added).
25 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
sales, when the parties compete. It explained that when the parties did not compete, actionable harm took the 
form of injury to the business reputation of the plaintiff’s goods: “If the persons likely to rely on the actor’s 
misrepresentation are also likely to deal with the [plaintiff] or to purchase his goods, they may be dissuaded 
from doing so if their experience with the actor’s goods is unpleasant.” Id. at cmt. g.
26  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra  note 20, § 2 cmt. f, § 4 cmt. d.. 
27  Id. at § 4 cmt. b.
21.  See Margreth Barrett, ????????????????????????????????????????28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2010).
22.  RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 19, § 712.
23.  Id. at cmt. d.
24.  Id. § 712 (emphasis added).
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the parties compete. It explained that when the parties did not compete, actionable harm took the form of injury 
to the business reputation of the plaintiff’s goods: “If the persons likely to rely on the actor’s misrepresentation 
are also likely to deal with the [plaintiff] or to purchase his goods, they may be dissuaded from doing so if their 
experience with the actor’s goods is unpleasant.” Id. at cmt. g.
26.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra  note 19, § 2 cmt. f, § 4 cmt. d.
27.  Id. at § 4 cmt. b.
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The ALI categorized false advertising, passing off, and reverse passing off together, as 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????28 In doing so, it characterized 
the residual passing off cause of action as more nearly akin to the cause of action for 
false advertising (which was now more generally accepted than it had been in 1938) than 
to trademark, trade name or trade dress infringement. The ???????????? ???????? ??????????
????????????? “Deceptive Marketing” chapter provides “general principles” applicable to all 
the delineated forms of deceptive marketing in §§ 2 and 3, then addresses special subcategories 
of deceptive marketing, including passing off, in § 4 and reverse passing off, in § 5.
???????? ?? ??????? ?????????????????????? ?????????? ?? ??????????????? ????????? ??? ???????
services, or commercial activities, in the course of marketing them, that is likely to deceive 
or mislead prospective purchasers to the likely commercial detriment of another. The 
comments stress that the cause of action for deceptive marketing only applies to commercial 
speech,29 and that liability may only be imposed if the deception is “?????????????????????????
?????????? of the person seeking relief.”30  Section 3 provides that a misrepresentation will be 
“to the likely commercial detriment of” the person seeking relief if it ??????????? (is likely to 
“affect the conduct of prospective purchasers”), and there is a reasonable basis for believing 
that the representation has caused or is likely to cause a diversion of trade from the plaintiff 
or harm the plaintiff’s reputation or good will. Comment b adds that “[R]epresentations that 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
not material.”31
28  Id. ch. 2. The ???????????????????? recognized a very limited cause of action for false advertising in § 
761, which was grouped in a category of torts labeled “Miscellaneous Trade Practices.”
29  Id. § 2, cmt. a. According to the comment, “[d]etermining the likelihood that a representation will 
deceive or mislead is closely analogous to determining the likelihood of confusion under the rule governing 
the infringement of trademarks.” 
30  Id.at cmt. d (emphasis added).
31  The passing off form of deceptive marketing primarily focused on a defendant’s misrepresentation 
about the source of its product or service. Id., at § 4. In describing the passing off cause of action, 
Restatement § 4 and its comments note that misrepresentations relating to source clearly lead to mistaken 
purchases and injury to the plaintiff’s business reputation, ???? cmt. f,  so that one can be assured that the 
requisite “commercial detriment” or harm necessary to constitute deceptive marketing occurs. Id. For this 
reason, “independent proof of likely commercial detriment should not be necessary in order to establish 
liability.” Id. cmt. a. This comment should not be construed to mean that “likely commercial detriment” 
and its “materiality” component are ??????????? to the passing off cause of action—only that they can be 
assumed in passing off cases when the defendant’s misrepresentation relates to product or service source. If 
the defendant’s misrepresentation is not about source, or likely to communicate the information inherent in 
“source” (quality or characteristics of the defendant’s products), then the presumed harm (mistaken purchasers, 
injury to reputation) is not certain to occur, and the misrepresentation cannot be assumed to cause “commercial 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
license between producers of very different goods or services (and therefore did not communicate information 
about product quality or characteristics), independent proof of commercial detriment/materiality ?????? 
be required (or at the least, the defendant should be permitted to demonstrate the????????? of commercial 
detriment and materiality of the misrepresentation). 
 This understanding in § 4 is reinforced in the following section, which addresses misrepresentations 
28.  Id. ch. 2. The ???????????????????? recognized a very limited cause of action for false advertising in § 761, 
which was grouped in a category of torts labeled “Miscellaneous Trade Practices.”
29.  Id. § 2, cmt. a. According to the comment, “[d]etermining the likelihood that a representation will deceive or 
mislead is closely analogous to determining the likelihood of confusion under the rule governing the infringement 
of trademarks.” 
30.  Id. at cmt. d (emphasis added).
31.  The passing off form of deceptive marketing primarily focused on a defendant’s misrepresentation about 
the source of its product or service. Id., at § 4. In describing the passing off cause of action, Restatement § 4 and 
its comments note that misrepresentations relating to source clearly lead to mistaken purchases and injury to the 
plaintiff’s business reputation,  ???? cmt. f,  so that one can be assured that the requisite “commercial detriment” 
or harm necessary to constitute deceptive marketing occurs. Id.  For this reason, “independent proof of likely 
commercial detriment should not be necessary in order to establish liability.” Id. cmt. a. This comment should 
not be construed to mean that “likely commercial detriment” and its “materiality” component are ??????????? 
to the passing off cause of action—only that they can be assumed in passing off cases when the defendant’s 
misrepresentation relates to product or service source. If the defendant’s misrepresentation is not about source, 
or likely to communicate the information inherent in “source” (quality or characteristics of the defendant’s 
products), then the presumed harm (mistaken purchases, injury to reputation) is not certain to occur, and the 
???????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????? ?????
defendant’s misrepresentation only went to the existence of a license between producers of very different 
goods or services (and therefore did not communicate information about product quality or characteristics), 
independent proof of commercial detriment/materiality ?????? be required (or at the least, the defendant should 
be permitted to demonstrate the????????? of commercial detriment and materiality of the misrepresentation). 
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The ???????????? ????????????????????????????? thus should be understood as providing 
a cause of action for “residual” passing off claims that do not turn on infringement of valid 
trademark, trade name, or trade dress rights and impose liability on a more conservative 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????
when the defendant’s misrepresentation does not communicate that the plaintiff is the source 
of the defendant’s goods or services (or the information inherent in the source—that the 
defendant’s goods have the quality or characteristics of the plaintiff’s).
B. A Statutory Niche
??????? ????? ???????????? ?????????? ??????????? ?? ?????32 to incorporate not only the 
common-law cause of action for infringement of unregistered trademarks, trade names, and 
trade dress, ???????? the “residual” common-law cause of action for passing off, as described 
in the ???????????????????? and ?????????????????????????????????????????????.33  In Dastar 
???????????????????????????????????????????the Supreme Court explained that § 43(a)  goes 
“beyond trademark infringement” to redress other forms of “false designation of origin, 
false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact which 
. . . is likely to cause confusion . . . as to the origin . . . of  . . . goods or services.”34 The 
Court cautioned that “§ 43(a) does not have boundless application as a remedy for unfair 
trade practices.” Rather, § 43(a) “prohibits actions like trademark infringement that deceive 
consumers and impair a producer’s goodwill.” The Court noted that the Lanham Act should 
be read “in accordance with the Act’s common-law foundations,” and (consistent with the 
Restatement’s “commercial detriment”/materiality requirement) stressed that “the words of 
the Lanham Act should not be stretched to cover matters that are typically of no consequence 
to consumers.”35  The Dastar Court also made it clear that the residual passing off cause of 
action should be applied carefully, in a manner that accommodates competing interests in free 
competition, constitutional limitations, and public policy.
constituting reverse passing off. In the case of claims for reverse passing off, the Restatement expressly 
provides that the ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????(including materiality). Id. 
§ 5. The comments explain that the threat of harm to the plaintiff’s commercial interests in such cases is less 
immediate and “less clearly injurious,” than in the case of passing off, because the defendant is selling the 
plaintiff’s product as its own, rather than its own product as plaintiff’s. Id. cmt. c.  Reverse passing off only 
creates a likelihood of a future diversion of trade due to consumers’ inability to attribute the plaintiff’s goods to 
the plaintiff. Thus, the defendant should only be subjected to liability if the plaintiff can establish both the fact 
of a misrepresentation and commercial detriment. Id. cmt. f.
32  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
33  See, e.g., Blinded Veterans Assn. v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1042-48 (D.C. Cir. 
1989); Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F.Supp. 612, 625 (S.D. N.Y. 1985). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, supra, note 20, at § 2, Introductory Note, § 4 cmt. b.
34  539 U.S. 23, 29, 31 (2003) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)).
35  Id. at 29-37.
This understanding in § 4 is reinforced in the following section, which addresses misrepresentations 
constituting reverse passing off. In the case of claims for reverse passing off, the Restatement expressly provides 
that the ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????(including materiality). Id. § 5. The 
comments explain that the threat of harm to the plaintiff’s commercial interests in such cases is less immediate 
and “less clearly injurious,” than in the case of passing off, because the defendant is selling the plaintiff’s product 
as its own, rather than its own product as plaintiff’s. Id. cmt. c.  Reverse passing off only creates a likelihood of 
a future diversion of trade due to consumers’ inability to attribute the plaintiff’s goods to the plaintiff. Thus, the 
defendant should only be subjected to liability if the plaintiff can establish both the fact of a misrepresentation 
and commercial detriment. Id. cmt. f.
32.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
33.  See, e.g., Blinded Veterans Assn. v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1042–48 (D.C. Cir. 
1989); Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 625 (S.D. N.Y. 1985). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, supra note 19, at § 2, Introductory Note, § 4 cmt. b.
34.  Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 29, 31 (2003) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)).
35.  Id. at 29–37.
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Cases denominated “passing off” under modern common law and Lanham Act § 43(a) do 
not focus on the plaintiff’s proprietary rights in a mark or other indication of origin, or on the 
defendant’s use of protected words or symbols, as such. Rather, they focus on determining 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????
and thus confusing consumers. For example, a number of “passing off” cases have addressed 
situations in which the defendant uses the same generic word as the plaintiff to identify its 
product or service. They have held that use of the same ????????????, in itself, will not 
constitute passing off, but a showing of additional acts or omissions on the defendant’s part 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
clearly labeling its products, adding additional, distinguishing words or symbols, adopting 
dissimilar packaging or marketing materials, or by providing disclaimers. Or courts may 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of confusion created through use of the same generic words or symbols, such as referring 
to its products as “genuine,” or “the original,” or duplicating the plaintiff’s catalog or style 
numbers.36
In other cases courts have found actionable passing off when the defendant misrepresented 
itself as the plaintiff’s agent, thereby causing a likelihood of confusion about the plaintiff’s 
????????????????? ?????????????????? ???? ???????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????
activities.”37 In another example, a court found that the plaintiff (who advertised its product 
heavily on television) stated a § 43(a) passing off claim against a defendant (who did little 
television advertising), when the defendant promoted its competing product “as advertised 
on TV.”38???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
defendant reproduced non-trademark aspects of the plaintiff’s personal identity in marketing 
its products or services—a form of false representation of endorsement.39 In addition, they 
have found that substitution cases (where the customer orders plaintiff’s brand, but the 
defendant silently supplies defendant’s product instead) can constitute “passing off” under 
§ 43(a).40
36  For examples, see Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Blinded Veterans Assn., 
v. Blinded American Veterans Foundation, 872 F.2d 1035, 1042-48 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Liquid Controls Corp. v. 
Liquid Control Corp., 802 F.2d 934 (7th Cir. 1986); Murphy door Bed Co., Inc. v. Interior Sleep Systems, Inc., 
874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1989); Midwest Plastics Corp. v. Protective Closures Co., 285 F.2d 747 (10th Cir. 1960); 
Pennsylvania State Univ. v. University Orthopedics, Ltd, 706 A.2d 863 (Penn. Superior Ct. 1998).
37  See, e.g., Schlotzsky’s, Ltd. v. Sterling Purchasing and National Distributing Co., 502 F.3d 393 (5th 
Cir. 2008).
38  Popeil Bros., Inc. v. Morris, 176  U.S.P.Q. 353 (D.N.J. 1972).
39  See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), ?????????????? 506 U.S. 1080 (1993); 
Alan v. National Video, Inc., 610 F.Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); American Ventures Inc. v. Post, Buckley, 
Schuh & Jernigan, Inc., 1993 W.L. 468643 (W.D. Wash. 1993); National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 
503 F.Supp. 533 (W.D. Tex. 1980). 
40  See, e.g., PIC Design Corp. v. Bearings Specialty Co., 436 F.2d 804 (1st Cir. 1971).
36.  For examples, see Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); ??????????????????????, 872 
F.2d 1035, 1042–48; Liquid Controls Corp. v. Liquid Control Corp., 802 F.2d 934 (7th Cir. 1986); Murphy Door 
Bed Co., Inc. v. Interior Sleep Systems, Inc., 874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1989); Midwest Plastics Corp. v. Protective 
Closures Co., 285 F.2d 747 (10th Cir. 1960); Pa. State Univ. v. Univ. Orthopedics, Ltd, 706 A.2d 863 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1998).
37.  See, e.g., Schlotzsky’s, Ltd. v. Sterling Purchasing & Nat’l Distrib. Co., 502 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2008).
38.  Popeil Bros., Inc. v. Morris, 176  U.S.P.Q. 353 (D.N.J. 1972).
39.  See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), ?????????????? 506 U.S. 1080 (1993); Alan 
v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Am. Ventures Inc. v. Post, Buckley, Schuh & Jernigan, 
Inc., 1993 W.L. 468643 (W.D. ash. 1993); Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. 
Tex. 1980). 
40.  See, e.g., PIC Design Corp. v. Bearings Specialty Co., 436 F.2d 804 (1st Cir. 1971).
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Thus, just as in the Restatements, Lanham Act § 43(a) provides????? a cause of action for 
infringement of unregistered indications of origin and a cause of action for a residual category 
of “passing off” claims (that do not involve use of protected indications of origin). As in 
common law, “residual” passing off no longer requires that the defendant act with fraudulent 
intent. Many of the decisions do not expressly discuss the issue of materiality. In most cases, 
it is unnecessary to do so, because the alleged misrepresentation suggests that the plaintiff 
is the source of the defendant’s product or service, and materiality can be assumed. The 
Supreme Court’s decision in the Dastar case nonetheless suggests that materiality remains 
a highly relevant element in evaluating claims that deviate from that traditional scenario. 
And there is precedent, in addition to the Restatements, for imposing an express materiality 
requirement. For example, in ???????? ????41 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected 
a § 43(a) passing off claim on the ground that the alleged misrepresentation would not be 
material to purchasers. In ????, the daughter of a deceased blues singer sued the defendant, 
who had falsely named himself as “producer” on the back of CDs of the blues singer’s live 
recordings. In rejecting the reverse passing off claim the Fifth Circuit expressly required 
????? ????????????????????????????????????????????? ????? ??? ?????????????????????????????
decisions—as a precondition to passing off liability. 
C. My Proposed Cause of Action for Passing Off/Associational Marketing
As noted supra, I would relegate four classes of claims now brought and evaluated as 
“trademark infringement” to evaluation as a form of residual passing off claim, pursuant 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
marketing” claims. They include:
1. Infringement claims involving ?????????? ????? ???? ?????????? ??? ?? ?????????? ??? ??????
????????????? ???????? ???? ????????? ????? ?????????? ???? ????????? ??? ????? ??? ???? ?????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????. This category 
of cases would look much like the category of cases that Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna 
describe in their “Irrelevant Confusion” article,42 and for which they advocate application of 
a materiality prerequisite to recovery.
41  King v. Ames, 179 F.3d 370, 373-75 (5th Cir. 1999). See also Silverman v. CBS, 870 F.2d 40, 49 (2d 
Cir. 1989).
42  Lemley & McKenna, supra, note 4. Lemley and McKenna propose to eliminate the “sponsorship 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the defendant’s use of a similar mark is likely to cause consumer confusion about who is responsible for the 
quality of the defendant’s goods. Id. at 415, 427. They would relegate trademark claims not falling into this 
category to be dealt with, if at all, through a cause of action “analogous to false advertising.” Id. at 427. This 
suggestion is consistent with mine, except I would avail myself of the existing “passing off” cause of action, 
include a wider range of infringement claims in the category, and introduce a wider range of limitations and 
defenses, beyond materiality.
41.  King v. Ames, 179 F.3d 370, 373–75 (5th Cir. 1999). See also Silverman v. CBS, 870 F.2d 40, 49 (2d Cir. 
1989).
42.  Lemley & McKenna, supra note 3. Lemley and McKenna propose to eliminate the “sponsorship or 
???????????? ???????????? ??? ?????????? ???????????????????? ???? ???????? ???? ????????????? ????????????????? ????
defendant’s use of a similar mark is likely to cause consumer confusion about who is responsible for the quality 
of the defendant’s goods. Id. at 415, 427. They would relegate trademark claims not falling into this category to 
be dealt with, if at all, through a cause of action “analogous to false advertising.” Id. at 427. This suggestion is 
consistent with mine, except I would avail myself of the existing “passing off” cause of action, include a wider 
range of infringement claims in the category, and introduce a wider range of limitations and defenses, beyond 
materiality.
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2. Infringement claims in which the ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
This would include Internet infringement cases in which the defendant has made a hidden 
reference to the plaintiff’s mark (for example, in web site metatags or as a key word to trigger 
advertising), to which consumers are not exposed. It would also include cases in which the 
defendant does not closely associate the allegedly infringing word or symbol with goods or 
services that it is marketing, so that consumers are unlikely to understand the use as indicating 
the source of the defendant’s goods or services—for example Internet cases in which the 
defendant incorporates the plaintiff’s mark into its domain name, or features the mark on its 
web site, but does not sell or advertise goods or services on the web site.
 
3. Infringement claims in which the ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????
4. Claims alleging? ????????????? ???????? ???? ??? ???? ????????? ???????? ??? ???????????????
????????For this purpose I would stress that the term “commercial speech” does not encompass 
all speech made in a commercial context, or that has some connection with other speech 
that is commercial.43 Rather, this category of claims would include any case in which the 
defendant’s referral to the plaintiff’s mark does more than merely propose a commercial 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????44
These four classes of infringement claims all exceed the traditional scope of rights that 
trademark owners have in words or symbols, and have all been criticized as going well beyond 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
threaten the kinds of marketplace harm that trademark law was created to prevent. Rather, 
they have generally arisen through misplaced notions of property rights arising from the 
fact of investment. While the actions targeted in these cases may enable free riding in some 
instances, or undermine the mark owner’s ability to control the unique “identity” and image 
it has constructed for its brand, they generally do not pose meaningful harm to consumers, or 
consumers’ reliance interests in marks, or threaten direct diversion of trade through mistaken 
purchases. 
 
??? ????????? ???????????????? ??????? ??? ?????? ????????????????????????????????????????????
impairment of societal interests in marketplace competition, development of new market 
43  See, e.g., PETA v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. 
Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629 (KMW), 1997 W.L. 133313 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997), aff’d,  152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 
1998), ?????????????? 525 U.S. 834 (1998).
44  Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery 
Network, 507 U.S. 410, 422 (1993). See  Margreth Barrett, ???????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????? ??????????????????????39 CONN. L. REV. 973 (2007). I would incpassing off/lude 
in this “associate/passing off” category not just uses of marks in “core” commercial speech, but also uses of 
marks in “mixed speech.” 
43.  See, e.g., PETA v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Bucci, No. 
97 Civ. 0629 (KMW), 1997 W.L. 133313 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997), aff’d,  152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. 
???????? 525 U.S. 834 (1998).
44.  Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 
U.S. 410, 422 (1993). See  Margreth Barrett, ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????? ???????????? 39 CONN. L. REV. 973 (2007). I would include in this “passing off/associated 
marketing” category not just uses of marks in “core” commercial speech, but also uses of marks in “mixed 
speech.” 
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related digital technologies, and First Amendment interests.45 Because they threaten to upset 
the proper balance of competing interests, they need a good, hard looking-over, beyond what 
is normally required for more “traditional” trademark infringement cases, before relief is 
granted.
Because these four classes of claims assert rights that exceed those generally necessary 
to protect societal interests in avoiding confusion, and may impair other, competing societal 
interests, they should be considered ???????? ???? ?????????? ??? ?????????? ??????? ??? ??????
??? ???????, like residual passing off claims that don’t allude to marks or that only entail 
use of similar generic words or symbols. Evaluating them as passing off claims, rather than 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and focus the courts instead on the ???????????????? of the defendant’s actions. Outside of 
the infringement context, courts should focus more critically on the nature and magnitude of 
likely harm arising from the defendant’s actions, in light of the surrounding circumstances. 
In this less routine evaluation, courts might be encouraged to put the defendant’s actions 
into a larger context, and evaluate them in light of overall competition interests, their impact 
on the parties’ and the public’s First Amendment interests, and on developing technologies. 
These classes of claims are also better evaluated as “passing off” claims because there is more 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????, beyond those imposed in trademark infringement cases. I will discuss 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Michael Grynberg  has expressed concerns that courts may refuse to take the initiative to 
make reforms of this nature, due to trends toward judicial formalism and textualism. 46 This 
would be most unfortunate. Because the Lanham Act was intended to codify the common 
law, courts have played a particularly important role in shaping the causes of action the Act 
provides.47 Congress has tended to follow the courts’ lead. Many of Congress’ amendments 
?????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
courts.48 Thus, it seems appropriate and well-precedented for courts to undertake reform of 
the kind I suggest. Indeed, when Congress amended Lanham Act § 43(a) in 1988 to codify 
the interpretation that courts had given to that provision, the Senate Report accompanying 
the amendment expressly stated an expectation that “the courts [will] continue to interpret 
the section.”49 
45   I have discussed these impairments elsewhere, so I will not reiterate them here. See 
Margreth Barrett, ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????39 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 371 (2006).
46  Michael Grynberg, ??????????? ?????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897, 927 (2009). But see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, ??????????????????????????????????????
13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99 (2009).
47  Pierre N. Leval, ??????????????????????????????????, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187, 198-99 (2004).
48  See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 105-330 § 201(a)(2), 112 Stat. 3064 (1998)(codifying court-developed 
functionality doctrine).
49  S. Rep. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5603 (1988).
45.  I have discussed these impairments elsewhere, so I will not reiterate them here. See Margreth Barrett, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371 (2006).
46.  Michael Grynberg, ????????????????? ??????????????? ??????????????????? ??? ?? ?????????????????24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897, 927 (2009). But see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, ??????????????????????????????????????
13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99 (2009).
47.  Pierre N. Leval, ??????????????????????????????????, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187, 198–99 (2004).
48.  See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 105-330 § 201(a)(2), 112 Stat. 3064 (1998)(codifying court-developed functionality 
doctrine).
49.  S. Rep. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5603 (1988).
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When protection of marks poses special threats to competition or free speech interests, 
courts have not hesitated to respond with special rules and defenses. For example, in?????
??????????????????????????????????50 the Supreme Court responded to competition concerns by 
ruling categorically that product feature trade dress cannot be deemed inherently distinctive, 
but must be demonstrated to have acquired secondary meaning as a prerequisite to protection. 
For the same reasons, several of the Circuits have fashioned special standards for determining 
likelihood of confusion in product feature infringement cases.51 In light of First Amendment 
concerns, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit declined to extend the doctrine of initial 
interest confusion in Internet cases.52 Several Circuit Courts of Appeals have adopted special 
balancing tests to be applied in infringement claims involving the titles of expressive works.53 
Both the Ninth and the Third Circuits have adopted express rules or defenses to enable 
nominative uses of marks.54 Courts should continue to recognize and accept this responsibility 
to maintain the proper balance of interests in Lanham Act cases. With regard to my proposal, 
many of the necessary mechanisms are already in place.
????? ??????????? ???????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
marks also allege violation of § 43(a) as a back-up, recognizing that § 43(a) covers a wider 
array of passing off claims. Nothing in the Lanham Act’s statutory language itself would 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
action for passing off under Lanham Act § 43(a), even if the claims allege infringement of a 
registered mark. 
As originally enacted, Lanham Act § 32(1)(a)55 provided for infringement liability when a 
defendant’s use of a registered mark was “likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive 
purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods or services”.56 In 1962, Congress amended 
this language to delete the words “purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods or 
services,”57? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
about the “source” of goods or services. This amendment might be construed to ????????? 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
50  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
51  See, e.g., Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1997), ?????????????? 
523 U.S. 1118 (1998); Dorr-Oliver, Inc., v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 381, 383-84 (7th Cir. 1996); Versa 
Products Co. v. Bifold Co. Mfg., 50 F.3d 189, 202-07 (3d Cir. 1995), ??????????????516 U.S. 808 (1995).
52  Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 316 (4th Cir. 2005), ??????????????547 U.S. 1069 (2006).
53  See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003), ??????????????540 U.S. 1074 (2003); 
Mattel, Inc. v. Universal Music Int’l, 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002), ????????????? 537 U.S. 1171 (2003); Rogers 
v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
54  Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3rd Cir. 2005); New Kids on the 
Block v. News Am. Publ’g, 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
55   15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).
56  Pub. L. No. 498 § 32(1)(a), 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946),  60 Stat. 427, 437.
57  Pub. L. No. 772 § 17, § 32, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), 76 Stat. 769, 773.
50.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
51.  See, e.g., Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1997), ?????????????? 523 U.S. 
1118 (1998); Dorr-Oliver, Inc., v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 381, 383–84 (7th Cir. 1996); Versa Products Co. 
v. Bifold Co. Mfg., 50 F.3d 189, 202-07 (3d Cir. 1995), ??????????????516 U.S. 808 (1995).
52.  Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 316 (4th Cir. 2005), ??????????????547 U.S. 1069 (2006).
53.  See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003), ?????? ????????540 U.S. 1074 (2003); 
Mattel, Inc. v. Universal Music Int’l, 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002), ????????????? 537 U.S. 1171 (2003); Rogers 
v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
54.    Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3rd Cir. 2005); New Kids on the Block v. 
News Am. Publ’g, 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
55.  15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).
56.  Pub. L. No. 498 § 32(1)(a), 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946),  60 Stat. 427, 437.
57.  Pub. L. No. 772 § 17, § 32, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), 76 Stat. 769, 773.
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or in cases of post-sale or initial interest confusion, but it ???????????????????????????????? 
on courts to do so.58 
In 1988, Congress amended Lanham Act § 43(a) expressly to impose liability on persons 
who use (in connection with goods or services) a false designation of origin, false or misleading 
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact which “is likely to cause 
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????.”59 Congress undertook this 
general rewriting of the § 43(a) language “to codify the interpretation it ha[d] been given 
by the courts.”60????? ??????????????? ??? ?????? ????? ??????? ??? ?????????? ?????? ?????????????
or “association” (a license or endorsement), for example, are appropriately litigated under
§ 43(a). 
?????? ??? ?????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????? ???????????
name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer 
or merchant to identify and distinguish his goods, including a unique product, from those 
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is 
unknown.”61? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
new “intent to use” registration procedures,62 it did not undertake to track the changes it made 
?????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? as indicating source or 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???? ?????????????????????????
that Congress intended that claims about licenses, endorsements, and other party relationships 
58  The legislative history provides little information about Congress’ intent in deleting that statutory 
language. It only suggests that the deletion was made to make the language of § 32(1)(a) “parallel to a similar 
change made in § 2(d),” S. Rep. No. 2107, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2844, 2851, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
Prior to the 1962 amendments, § 2(d) prohibited registration of a mark that was likely “to cause confusion or 
mistake or to deceive purchasers.” The amendments deleted the word “purchasers,” and the accompanying 
Senate Report explained that Congress deleted the word to avoid misconstruction, “since the provision 
actually relates to potential purchasers as well as to actual purchasers.” Id., 1962 U..S.C.C.A.N. at 2847. 
59  Pub. L. No. 667, § 43, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), 102 Stat. 3935, 3946.
60  S. Rep. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5603. The Senate Report 
elaborated: “As written, §43(a) appears to deal only with false descriptions or representations and false 
designations of geographic origin. Since its enactment in 1946, however, it has been widely interpreted as 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????




symbol, or device, or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his 
goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others.” Pub. L. No. 489 § 45, 79th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1946), 60 Stat. 427, 443. 
62  Pub. L. No. 667.
58.  The legislative history provides little information about Congress’ intent in deleting that statutory language. 
It only suggests that the deletion was made to make the language of § 32(1)(a) “parallel to a similar change 
????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????? ?????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1962 amendments, § 2(d) prohibited registration of a mark that was likely “to cause confusion or mistake or 
to deceive purchasers.” The amendments deleted the word “purchasers,” and the accompanying Senate Report 
explained that Congress deleted the word to avoid misconstruction, “since the provision actually relates to 
potential purchasers as well as to actual purchasers.” Id., 1962 U..S.C.C.A.N. at 2847. 
59.  Pub. L. No. 667, § 43, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), 102 Stat. 3935, 3946.
60.  S. Rep. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5603. The Senate Report elaborated: 
“As written, §43(a) appears to deal only with false descriptions or representations and false designations of 
geographic origin. Since its enactment in 1946, however, it has been widely interpreted as creating, in essence, a 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
unfair competition law, the committee expects the courts to continue to interpret the section.” Id.
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
device, or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and 
distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others.” Pub. L. No. 489 § 45, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), 
60 Stat. 427, 443. 
62.  Pub. L. No. 667.
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that do not communicate source, product quality or characteristics be litigated as passing off 
claims under § 43(a), rather than as registered or unregistered trademark infringement.
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
relegating infringement cases to a “passing off” evaluation when the defendant made 
no “trademark use.”63  Moreover, while there is no statutory language expressly limiting 
infringement claims to commercial speech or point-of-sale confusion, there is likewise no 
express language requiring such claims to be litigated as “infringement” rather than passing 
off. Courts expanded the infringement cause of action to encompass such claims and they 
should be able to re-classify them as passing off claims.
D. Limitations and Defenses on “Passing Off/Associational Marketing” Claims
??????? ?????????? ???? ?????? ?????????? ??? ???? ?????? ???????? ????? ?? ?? ?????? ????????? ????
associational marketing” evaluation, we can focus on the evaluation process itself. These 
categories of cases—1) cases alleging confusion over the existence of sponsorship or 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
information about product quality; 2) cases in which the defendant did not make a “trademark 
use”; 3) cases relying on initial interest or post-sale confusion; and 4) cases asserting claims 
against statements made in non-commercial speech—assert harms to mark owners that are 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
questionable harm to consumers. For this reason, they are less likely to justify the potential 
impairment they pose to competing interests in marketplace competition, First Amendment 
interests, and the interest in unfettered development of new digital marketing tools. They 
should be more carefully scrutinized and subjected to additional limitations and defenses 
beyond those imposed against trademark uses in commercial speech that threaten point-of-sale 
source/quality confusion. The following subsections discuss particular kinds of limitations or 
defenses that should be considered. They draw liberally from ideas expressed by some of the 
other Roundtable participants. Some of them overlap with others.
Michael Grynberg has raised the point that Lanham Act § 33(b)64 may be construed to limit 
infringement defenses to those it expressly lists.65 He has also cited precedent suggesting 
that traditional defenses to trademark infringement, such as abandonment, may not be found 
to extend to residual passing off claims.66 I would make lemonade of these concerns. To the 
extent that § 33(b) limits courts’ ability to augment  defenses to ????????????? ?????????, its 
prohibition should not extend to a claim for residual passing off, where the liability does 
not turn on the plaintiff’s ownership of valid trademark rights. Section 33(b) concerns itself 
63   See Barrett, supra note 10, at 943-60.
64   15 U.S.C. § 1115(b).
65  Grynberg, supra note 47, at 945-47.
66  Id. at 916-17.
3.  See Barrett, supra note 9, at 943–60.
4.  15 U.S.C. § 115(b).
65.  Grynberg, supra note 46, at 945–47.
66.  Id. at 916–17.
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strictly with rights in trademarks. It limits challenges to “the validity of the registered 
mark,” “the registration of the mark,” “the registrant’s ownership of the mark,” and “the 
registrant’s exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce.”  Since the residual 
passing off cause of action provides rights beyond those afforded through trademark 
ownership or registration, the ownership, registration, or validity of the plaintiff’s mark 
is essentially irrelevant. Moreover, even if courts are disinclined to extend trademark 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
does not prevent them from developing a specially tailored set of defenses to passing off/
associational marketing claims.
 1. Materiality Requirement
Rebecca Tushnet, Mark Lemley, Mark McKenna, Michael Grynberg, and others have 
advocated imposing a materiality requirement in at least some infringement causes of action, 
and this is a sound suggestion. As the ????????????????????????????????????????? suggests, 
materiality might be assumed in infringement actions when a competitor  or producer of related 
goods uses a mark in a manner that is likely to confuse consumers about product source (and 
by implication, about the product’s quality and characteristics). Indeed, the early common 
law imposed an inherent materiality requirement by limiting the infringement cause of action 
to cases involving similar or related products and confusion about source.67 However, courts’ 
subsequent expansion of actionable confusion has left that built-in assurance of materiality 
along the wayside. When the likely consumer confusion is not about source or responsibility 
for product quality, only occurs at times other than the point of purchase, or is not made 
in direct, perceptible reference to a product or service that the defendant is marketing (as 
in the non-trademark use cases), materiality is not self-evident, and the defendant should 
be required to prove it. As Bob Bone stressed in the course of the Roundtable, without a 
showing of materiality (that is, that the alleged misrepresentation about source, sponsorship, 
?????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
from a societal standpoint. Yet a likelihood of harm clearly is a prerequisite to a Lanham Act 
cause of action.68 
67  As noted earlier, there is some case precedent for imposing a materiality requirement in passing off 
cases. See supra note 48. Rebecca Tushnet has pointed out that limiting the likelihood of confusion evaluation 
to “relevant” consumers (those who might be interested in buying the parties’ products) is also a “?????????
application” of the materiality concept. See Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal 
Trademark and False Advertising Law ???????????????? ????????????????????????????????
68  See, e.g., King v. Ames, 179 F.3d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 1999). Rebecca Tushnet points out that while 
neither the § 43(a)(1)(A)  nor the § 43(a)(1)(B) language refers expressly to materiality, courts have implied 
a materiality requirement in false advertising cases. This adds legitimacy to the suggestion that they imply 
a materiality requirement on passing off cases, as well. Tushnet, supra note 68, at 29. Michael Grynberg 
reasons that applying a materiality requirement “would not suffer from a legitimacy objection” under a 
textualist regime because it could be deemed a part of the likelihood of confusion evaluation, which is not 
????????????????????????????????????????supra note 47, at 963-64.
67.  As noted earlier, there is some case precedent for imposing a materiality requirement in passing off cases. 
See supra note 41. Rebecca Tushnet has pointed out that limiting the likelihood of confusion evaluation to 
“relevant” consumers (those who might be interested in buying the parties’ products) is also a “???? ?????
application” of the materiality concept. See Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal 
Trademark and False Advertising Law ???????????????? ????????????????????????????????
68.  See, e.g., King v. Ames, 179 F.3d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 1999). Rebecca Tushnet points out that while neither the 
§ 43(a)(1)(A)  nor the § 43(a)(1)(B) language refers expressly to materiality, courts have implied a materiality 
requirement in false advertising cases. This adds legitimacy to the suggestion that they imply a materiality 
requirement on passing off cases, as well. Tushnet, supra note 67, at 29. Michael Grynberg reasons that applying 
a materiality requirement “would not suffer from a legitimacy objection” under a textualist regime because it 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Grynberg, supra note 46, at 963-64.
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Imposing a materiality requirement in passing off/associational marketing cases may prove 
problematic, however. Materiality is generally a matter of consumer perception, much like the 
likelihood of confusion inquiry. Undertaking to assess the materiality of misrepresentations 
to consumers could augment the length, cost, and complexity of litigation, and thus further 
increase the chilling effect that threats of litigation have on competition and First Amendment 
interests. Moreover, we may encounter the same kind of feed-back loop with materiality that 
we experience in the likelihood of confusion context. Just as mark owners have convinced 
consumers that all third-party uses of marks must be licensed (leading consumers to assume 
that any third-party use they encounter therefore ??? licensed), mark owners may convince 
consumers that the existence of a license agreement provides material information about 
quality (after all, rules regarding mark abandonment essentially require that mark owners 
oversee the quality of their licensee’s goods,69 even if that requirement is rarely enforced). 
Mark owners may also argue for an expansive understanding of “materiality”—for example, 
that the misrepresentation that a licensing relationship exists is material to consumers 
because it imparts the licensor’s prestige and “personality” to the licensed goods—a valuable 
psychological boost to the image-conscious consumer.
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
rather than a descriptive way—that is, make some legal conclusions about what should and 
should not be deemed material by consumers: quality factors may be material, but prestige 
???????? ???? ????? ??? ?? ???????????????? product ???????????? ?? a particular person or 
organization may be material, while a more general suggestion of ???????????????? the same 
person or organization may not. In initial-interest confusion cases, materiality might be judged 
not by the substance of the misrepresentation (since the consumer knows the truth by the time 
any purchase is made), but by the effort the consumer must undergo to leave the defendant’s 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
computer and return to his search result, then it might be assumed that he will expend that 
?????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????
 2. Proximate Cause
To some extent, the issue of proximate cause is related to the materiality issue, and could be 
assumed in more traditional infringement contexts. (The defendant’s use of the mark causes 
consumers to be confused and make mistaken purchase decisions, which harms both the 
consumers and the mark owner). However, some of the recent Internet cases that dispense with 
any meaningful “trademark use” requirement suggest that more conscious consideration of 
proximate cause might be in order. For example, when a defendant makes a ?????????????????? 
of a mark—deep in proprietary software, so that consumers are never exposed to or aware of 
it—it is hard to see how that hidden use itself causes either confusion or any of the harm that 
69   See??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
69.  See??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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confusion might bring. In such cases it is the ?????????????? generated as the result of the 
hidden application that should be deemed the proximate cause of any subsequent consumer 
confusion and harm. To put it another way, the application of the mark is merely a means of 
getting a message to consumers. It is the message itself that has the capacity to confuse them. 
In the Internet context, this distinction may be particularly important, as different entities 
may control the means and the message.70 Imposing a proximate cause limitation may enable 
?????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
for consumers, free from the chilling effect of mark owner threats of suit.71
Of course, if courts succeed in turning their focus away from the defendant’s application 
of the plaintiff’s mark (with all its attendant property and free riding implications) in the 




 3. The Likelihood of Confusion Determination
Courts should also consider adjusting their likelihood of confusion evaluation in these 
“associational marketing” cases, given their more tangential relationship to the core concerns 
of trademark law. Again, the Roundtable participants discussed some useful approaches. 
One approach would be to raise the necessary showing of likely confusion beyond what has 
been required in more mainstream “trademark use in commercial speech causing a likelihood 
of point-of-sale confusion about source/quality” cases. Instead of accepting survey evidence 
demonstrating that 10-15% of consumers may be confused, impose a higher threshold, such 
as a ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the confusion is more questionable, and the potential damage caused by overprotection is 
greater by comparison.
Another approach might embrace a more prescriptive (as opposed to descriptive) standard 
for measuring likelihood of consumer confusion. Courts could create presumptions that 
certain pro-competitive or expressive actions are unlikely to cause confusion.72 Over time, 
70  Examples of the kinds of situations in which proximate cause may be problematic can be found in 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????
Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). For an interesting example of a similar proximate cause issue in 
a non-digital setting, see Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC v. Forest River, Inc., 2009 W.L. 418079 (N.D. 
Ind. 2009).
71   Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley would address this problem through the distinction between 
the direct and indirect infringement causes of action. See Stacey L. Dogan, ??????????????????????8 J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 135 (2010); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark Lemley, ???????????????????????????????
???????????????????????41 HOUS. L. REV. 777 (2004).
72  This is essentially what the Ninth Circuit’s nominative fair use procedure was originally meant to do. 
See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
70.  Examples of the kinds of situations in which proximate cause may be problematic can be found in Rescuecom 
????????? ?????????????????????????????? ??????????? ????????? ?????????????????? ???? ???????????? ??????????
F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). For an interesting example of a similar proximate cause issue in a non-digital setting, 
see Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC v. Forest River, Inc., 2009 W.L. 418079 (N.D. Ind. 2009).
71.  Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley would address this problem through the distinction between the direct and 
indirect infringement causes of action. See Stacey L. Dogan, ??????????????????????8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 135 (2010); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark Lemley, ??????????????? ??????????????? ??????????????????????
41 HOUS. L. REV. 777 (2004).
72.  This is essentially what the Ninth Circuit’s nominative fair use procedure was originally meant to do. See 
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
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such presumptions may assist to shape consumer perceptions, so that they are less likely to rely 
on those presumptively non-confusing actions for material information. Bill McGeveran has 
advocated creating statutory “safe harbors” that would simply exempt certain uses of marks 
from liability, regardless of likelihood of confusion.73  Other Roundtable members expressed 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????not within the stated 
scope of the exception or defense. Counterbalancing these concerns, express carve-outs would 
reduce the cost and length of litigation and might discourage chilling threats of litigation in 
cases in which the defendant’s actions arguably fall within the carve-out. I would advocate a 
judicially created irrebuttable presumption that actions consisting of non-commercial speech 
cause no actionable likelihood of confusion. As McGeveran notes, the harm that relief would 
pose to free speech interests would almost always outweigh the harm the allegedly infringing 
speech poses to trademark interests. And to the extent that there are exceptions to this general 
?????? ??????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
Roundtable discussions, Rebecca Tushnet emphasized how defamation and false advertising 
law tolerate false speech. Adopting a per se rule that occasionally permits such false speech in 
the associational marketing cases seems equally acceptable in the interest of promoting First 
Amendment values.74
Perhaps more central to my own proposal in this article, courts should not focus on the 
similarity of the parties’ marks when evaluating likelihood of consumer confusion in passing 
off/associational marketing cases. The emphasis should not be on the defendant’s use of “the 
plaintiff’s” word or symbol, because the claim seeks relief beyond the scope of rights afforded 
by trademark ownership—it asserts rights in the absence of the defendant’s trademark use, 
or for kinds of confusion that are not central to the core concerns of trademark law, or do not 
directly lead to mistaken purchases. Rather, courts should consider the total context in which 
consumers receive the defendant’s alleged misrepresentation. In particular, if the defendant’s 
product has other source indicators associated with it, courts should consider the ameliorating 
effect that their presence might have. Courts should also consider any other confusion-
????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
context. If it appears that the defendant was attempting merely to describe its own goods, 
compare them to the plaintiff’s, or explain how they might be used with the plaintiff’s, for 
example, that should give rise to a presumption that the defendant succeeded in communicating 
that non-actionable message to consumers (much as courts have routinely presumed that 
if the defendant undertook to confuse consumers it succeeded in doing so). Particularly in 
cases lacking traditional “trademark use” by the defendant, courts should consider how likely 
73 ?? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
cases. William McGeveran, ???????????????????????????????????BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
74  The ???????????????????????????????????????would limit “passing off” deceptive marketing claims to 
commercial speech. Id. § 2 cmt. a. Congress has expressly excepted all commercial speech from the causes of 
action for false advertising, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B), and trademark dilution, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)((3)(C).
???? ???????????????????? ??? ?????????? ????? ????????????? ??????????????????? ??????? ??? ????????????????????
William McGeveran, ???????????????????????????????????BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
74.  The ???????????? ????? ?????????? ????????????would limit “passing off” deceptive marketing claims to 
commercial speech. Id. § 2 cmt. a. Congress has expressly excepted all commercial speech from the causes of 
action for false advertising, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B), and trademark dilution, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)((3)(C).
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consumers are to associate the defendant’s actions with products or services the defendant 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
consumers encounter the defendant’s reference to the mark in non-commercial speech, courts 
should critically evaluate the likelihood that they will understand that reference to identify the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
It would also be very helpful to draw courts’ attention to literature describing the results 
of cognitive behavior and literary theory research regarding how consumers actually react to 
marks in various settings. Some of the Roundtable participants have already made good use 
of this new source of information.75 These studies may counteract some of the more extreme 
concerns of trademark owners.
 4. Limited Remedies
Finally, courts should cultivate more limited remedies in associational marketing cases, and 
avoid outright injunctions against all use of confusing words and symbols. As several of the 
Roundtable participants remarked, threats of litigation made through cease and desist letters 
may pose greater harm to competition and free speech interests than do the results in litigated 
cases. If mark owners are less certain of fully enjoining unauthorized uses of their marks, they 
may be less inclined to litigate, and thus less likely to challenge such uses through cease and 
desist letters. 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??
Laura Heyman has noted,76 it is unclear why courts have been hesitant to rely on disclaimers 
to address Lanham Act harms, given how much reliance the law places on disclaimers 
and warnings in other contexts, such as product liability cases. Particularly when potential 
confusion harm is indirect or relatively minor, requiring a disclaimer, in lieu of prohibiting 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
certainly precedent for this approach.77 
III. Conclusion
 I propose treating claims for the newer, more extreme extensions of trademark 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????? ??????????? ?????????? ????? ????? ??? ???????????????? ??????? ??????? ???????????
75   See, e.g., Laura A Heymann, ????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????
22 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 393 (2010); Lemley & McKenna, supra note 4; Rebecca Tushnet, ??????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????? 86 TEX. L. REV. 507 (2008);. 
76   Heymann, supra note 76.
77   See, e.g., Blinded Veterans Assn. v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1989). For 
more on this suggestion, see Lemley & McKenna, supra note 4, at 447; Rebecca Tushnet, supra  note 76, at 
32.
75.  See, e.g., Laura A. Heymann, ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????22 YALE 
J. L. & HUMAN. 393 (2010); Lemley & McKenna, supra note 3; Rebecca Tushnet, ????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????? 86 TEX. L. REV. 507 (2008). 
76.  Heymann, supra note 75.
77.  See, e.g., Blinded Veterans Assn. v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1989). For more 
on this suggestion, see Lemley & McKenna, supra note 3, at 447; Tushnet, supra note 67, at 32.
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rights in marks and emphasize their investment in converting “marks” into “brands.” 
Focusing on ?????????????? passing off, in lieu of ????????? trademarks may encourage courts 
to give greater weight to consumer interests and concerns, and to more actively consider and 
weigh the purported harm posed by many unauthorized uses of marks. A passing off context 
provides greater leeway to consider the collective impact of all the circumstances surrounding 
the defendant’s alleged misrepresentation, to introduce limiting doctrines of materiality and 
proximate cause, and to consider more demanding standards of likely consumer confusion, 
??????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to competing marketplace interests.
While courts may be more focused on a textual analysis of Lanham Act claims today 
than they have been in the past, my proposal may provide courts some comfort through its 
????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
“residual” category of passing off claims. It reminds us that the Lanham Act has never been 
solely focused on ownership of marks, and that when passing off is at issue, rather than 
a traditional trademark infringement claim, there is historical precedent for more  careful 
scrutiny.
The proposed “passing off/associational marketing” cause of action is no panacea: it would 
be far better if the infringement cause of action had not expanded to such a point that it requires 
drastic counteraction. Judicial-driven reforms are messy and inconsistent, and there is no 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
analysis, as they have in infringement claims.78 But the danger of that seems less severe than 
??? ???? ??????????? ??????? ????????? ???? ???????????????? ????????? ??????? ?????????????????????
enough to bring in countervailing concerns to moderate the anti-free-riding instincts. Courts 
?????? ?????????? ????????? ????????? ??????? ??????? ??????????? ???????????? ?????????? ???? ????????
cut—deciding which claims fall into the delineated categories of “associational marketing” 
claims, and thus should be channeled into a passing off analysis. My own preference would be 
to over-include, rather than under-include. Meritorious claims are likely to prevail, even if they 
are subject to the more rigorous scrutiny of the proposed passing off cause of action.
78  See, e.g.,?????????????????? 872 F.2d at 1046.
78.  See, e.g.,?????????????????? 872 F.2d at 1046.
